

Necessary and Sufficient Condition to Assess Initial-State-Opacity in
Live Bounded and Reversible Discrete Event Systems

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Francesco Basile, Gianmaria De Tommasi, Carlo Motta,
Claudio Sterle

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Outline



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The *opacity* problem



- **Opacity** in DES is related to the possibility of hiding a secret to external observers (the *intruders*)
- The secret can be either
 - a sequence of events → *Language-based opacity*
 - a **system state** → *State-based opacity*
 - **Initial State Opacity (ISO)**
 - Current State Opacity CSO
 - Final State Opacity




Y.-C. Wu and S. Lafortune,

Comparative analysis of related notions of opacity in centralized and coordinated architectures,

Discrete Event Dyn. Syst., vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 307–339, 2013




Example – 1/2



- **Observable** (t_4 and t_5) and **unobservable** (t_1 , t_2 and t_3) transitions (associated to events)
- Uncertain initial state (marking)
 - **secret** initial state
 $\vec{m}_s = (2\ 2\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0)^T$
 - **non-secret** initial state
 $\vec{m}_{ns1} = (1\ 2\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0)^T$
 $\vec{m}_{ns2} = (0\ 2\ 2\ 0\ 0\ 0)^T$



Example – 2/2



- Starting from \vec{m}_s the only observable transition that can *fire* (i.e. can be observed) is t_4
- The firing of t_4 is always justifiable starting from the non-secret marking \vec{m}_{ns2}
- By observing the fired transitions, under uncertain initial state, an intruder cannot infer if the system started from a secret marking \Rightarrow the PN system is ISO

Contribution of this work



- **A necessary and sufficient condition** to assess ISO in DES modeled with PN systems
- The approach relies on both
 - the **algebraic representation of the PN dynamic** . . .
 - → enables the use of a standard tool such as ILP problems to check ISO avoiding the computation of graphs whose size is comparable to the one of the reachability graph
 - . . .and **structural representation of the net in terms of T-invariants**
 - → allows to represent in a compact way all the possible dynamic evolution in live, bounded and reversible net systems

Contribution (cont'd)



- Only few approaches have been proposed in literature to deal with opacity by **exploiting the mathematical representation of PNs to avoid the explicit state space estimation**
- In X. Cong *et al.*, Automatica 2018 and ISA Transactions 2019, both ISO and CSO problem are tackled, but a **strong assumptions are made**
 - secret markings must be modeled by Generalized mutual Exclusion Constraints
 - both the subnets induced by observable and unobservable events need to be acyclic
- Our approach we consider an **arbitrary set of uncertain initial markings, that includes both secret and non-secret ones**
 - such an assumption is motivated by the fact that the intruder can know the system structure, but not the initial state

Notation & main assumption



■ Petri net systems

- The P/T net $N = (P, T, \mathbf{Pre}, \mathbf{Post})$
- The incidence matrix $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{Post} - \mathbf{Pre}$
- The net system $\mathcal{S} = \langle N, m_0 \rangle$
- Given a sequence $\sigma \in T^*$, $|\sigma|$ is its length and $\vec{\sigma} = \pi(\sigma)$ is the corresponding firing count vector
- $T = T_o \cup T_{uo}$ and $T_o \cap T_{uo} = \emptyset \rightarrow \mathbf{Pre}_o$ (\mathbf{Pre}_{uo}) is the restriction of the **Pre** matrix to the set of observable (unobservable) transitions. The same applies for \mathbf{Post}_o (\mathbf{Post}_{uo}) and \mathbf{C}_o (\mathbf{C}_{uo})

■ Assumptions

- **Boundedness** \rightarrow the number of tokens in all places is bounded for all the reachable states
- **Liveness** \rightarrow any transition can fire an infinite number of times
- **Reversibility** \rightarrow it is always possible (from any reachable state) to *go back* to the initial state
- Boundedness, liveness and reversibility are three basic properties **often fulfilled by engineering-relevant models**

Preliminary results – 1/3



Necessary and sufficient condition that must be fulfilled by every sequence with finite length enabled under the marking \vec{m}_0 (Garcia Vallès, 1999)
 There exists J integer vectors $\vec{s}_1, \dots, \vec{s}_J \in \mathbb{N}^n$ with $J \leq |\sigma|$ such that the following linear constraints are *fulfilled*

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{m}_0 &\geq \mathbf{Pre} \cdot \vec{s}_1 \\ \vec{m}_0 + \mathbf{C} \cdot \vec{s}_1 &\geq \mathbf{Pre} \cdot \vec{s}_2 \\ \dots & \end{aligned} \tag{1a}$$

$$\vec{m}_0 + \mathbf{C} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{J-1} \vec{s}_i \geq \mathbf{Pre} \cdot \vec{s}_J$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^J \vec{s}_i = \pi(\sigma) \tag{1b}$$

iff there exists at least one sequence σ , which is enabled under the marking \vec{m}_0

Preliminary results – 2/3



T-invariant

Given a net N , a vector $\vec{y} \in \mathbb{N}^n$ is called *T-invariant* if $\mathbf{C} \cdot \vec{y} = \vec{0}$

Support of a T-invariant

$$\|\vec{y}\| = \{t_j \in \mathcal{T} \mid \vec{y}(t_j) > 0\}$$

- A T-invariant \vec{y} has minimal support if there does not exist another T-invariant \vec{y}' such that $\|\vec{y}'\| \subset \|\vec{y}\|$
- The **set of MS T-invariants** $\mathcal{T}(N)$ is finite and constitutes a basis, i.e. any T-invariant can be obtained by linear combination of MS T-invariants

Preliminary results – 2/3



Boundedness, liveness and reversibility for any possible initial state imply that

$$\vec{\sigma} \leq \sum_{\vec{y}_i \in \mathcal{T}(N)} w_i \vec{y}_i$$

with $w_i \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\vec{\sigma}$ the firing count vector of any enabled sequence \rightarrow **the net system evolves only along sequences associated to T-invariants**

Main result – 1/3



To assess ISO, the following ILP problem must be solved,
 $\forall \vec{m}_s \in \mathcal{M}_s$ and $\forall \vec{y} \in \mathcal{T}(N)$,

$$\max \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^J \left[(J-j+1) \cdot \sum_{\tau \in \|\vec{y}\|_0} \vec{s}_j(\tau) + B \cdot b_j \right] \right\} \quad (2)$$

Start from a secret marking \vec{m}_s , search for the *minimum number* of firing count vectors that cover \vec{y} , each holding the maximum number of firings

subject to

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \vec{m}_s \geq \text{Pre}_{u_0} \cdot \vec{e}_{s_1} \\ \vec{m}_s + \mathbf{C}_{u_0} \cdot \vec{e}_{s_1} \geq \text{Pre}_o \cdot \vec{s}_1 \\ \vec{m}_s + \mathbf{C}_{u_0} \cdot \vec{e}_{s_1} + \mathbf{C}_o \cdot \vec{s}_1 \geq \text{Pre}_{u_0} \cdot \vec{e}_{s_2} \\ \dots \\ \vec{m}_s + \mathbf{C}_{u_0} \cdot \sum_{j=1}^J \vec{e}_{s_j} + \mathbf{C}_o \cdot \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \vec{s}_j \geq \text{Pre}_o \cdot \vec{s}_J \\ \sum_{j=1}^J \vec{s}_j(\tau) \geq \vec{y}(\tau), \quad \forall \tau \in T_o \\ \vec{s}_j \leq B(1-b_j) \cdot \vec{1}, \quad j = 1, \dots, J \\ \vec{e}_{s_j}, \vec{s}_j \in \mathbb{N}^n, \quad j = 1, \dots, J \\ b_j \in \{0, 1\}, \quad j = 1, \dots, J \end{array} \right. \quad \begin{array}{l} (3a) \\ (3b) \\ (3c) \\ (3d) \\ (3e) \end{array}$$


where $J \geq \mathcal{J}_{\min}$

Main results – 2/3



- Let \vec{s}_k^* be the not null solution of (2)–(3), with $k = 1, \dots, K \leq J$
- To assess ISO we seek for possible *unobservable explanations* of \vec{s}_k^* starting from any non-secret markings in \mathcal{M}_{ns}
 - **If an unobservable explanation EXISTS \Rightarrow the system is ISO**
 - **If an unobservable explanation DOES NOT EXIST \Rightarrow the system is NOT ISO**
- To this aim, the set of optimization vectors $\vec{q}_{k,1}, \dots, \vec{q}_{k,L_k} \in \mathbb{N}^n$, with $L_k = \|\vec{s}_k^*\|_1$, is used to justify each observable occurrence in \vec{s}_k^* with a sequence of unobservable transitions

Final example



- $T_O = \{t_3, t_4, t_5\}$ and $T_{UO} = \{t_1, t_2\}$
- MS T-invariants: $\vec{y}_1 = (0\ 1\ 2\ 0\ 1)^T$ and $\vec{y}_2 = (1\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0)^T$
- $\vec{m}_{s_1} = (2\ 0\ 0\ 0)^T$
- $\vec{m}_{ns} = (0\ 0\ 1\ 1)^T \rightarrow$ feasibility problem fails for $\vec{y}_1 \rightarrow$ NOT ISO
- $\vec{m}_{s_2} = (0\ 2\ 0\ 0)^T \rightarrow$ ISO
- Concerning the computational burden on Intel®Core™ i5 at 2.50 GHz and 8 GB of RAM
 - for \vec{m}_{s_2} and \vec{y}_1 , the feasibility problem (4) accounts for
 - 23 optimization variables
 - 64 constraints
 - the **total time** needed to allocate variables, setup the constraints and solve the feasibility problem in the Matlab environment equals is about **400 ms**

Conclusions



- A necessary and sufficient condition to check ISO in DES modeled as PN system has been presented
- The proposed approach is based on the algebraic representation of PNs, and requires the solution of optimization problems (ILP ones)
 - efficiently scales up with the net marking, especially for nets with high level of parallelism
- The result provided in this work enables to improve privacy of CPSs by enforcing opacity in DES following a supervisory control approach similar to the one proposed



F. Basile, G. De Tommasi, C. Sterle

Non-interference enforcement via supervisory control in bounded Petri nets,

IEEE Trans. Auto. Contr., vol. 66, no. 8, pp. 3653-3666, 2021

- Extend the proposed approach to the case of *labeled* PN systems and to the other state-based opacities

Questions?