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It-Clefts and Wh-clefts: two awkward sentence types

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1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to examine two constructions, It-Cleft Sentences (e.g. It is the who/that wrote the book) and Wh-Cleft Sentences (e.g. The one who wrote the book is me), which constitute a problematic area of contemporary research in grammar.

It-Cleft Sentences and Wh-Cleft Sentences (henceforth ICS and WCS, respectively) appear in a number of languages which are typologically different from each other, and have some, but not all, of their characteristics in common. In Malayalam, for example, in the configuration of the ICS, S is not recognizable: cf. Mohanan, 1978. Both ICS and WCS are present in many European languages (although ICS seem to have a more limited geographic distribution) and in Chinese. In the Semitic languages (Arabic, Hebrew) only the WCS type occurs. The present paper will deal mainly with English constructions and will also present, at the syntactic level, a comparative analysis between the constructions in English and the corresponding constructions in the Romance languages (French, Italian and Spanish). This comparison is useful in that it allows us to study the existence of a field of variability in the syntactic properties characterizing the way these types of sentences are realized in European languages.

In the literature, the treatment of ICS, in studies predominantly oriented towards the English language, has often gone hand in hand with the treatment of WCS. Although these constructions have been studied using various theoretical approaches and at various levels of analysis, an over-all picture still seems to be lacking. A first kind of problem concerns the syntactic level, more precisely, the manner in which the configuration of ICS is represented. One solution is to claim for ICS the basic configuration $It - is X - S$, where X is a string which must meet the condition of being a

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[1] I am indebted to Nigel Vincent for many valuable comments and suggestions. Of course, I take full responsibility for any errors.

[2] As far as the syntactic level is concerned, the problem has been studied essentially in terms of the derivation of this structure. In spite of the fact that the thesis of a derivability of ICS from WCS (Akinjajian 1975) has been dropped, in some way the affinity between these structures has continued to be more or less explicitly accepted, at both the syntactic level and the semantic level (see Hankamer, 1974; Pinkham & Hankamer, 1975; Gundel, 1977; Chomsky, 1977: 94-95).
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and the corresponding sentences in the Romance languages:

(3) (a) Colui che va a Roma sono io.
    (b) Chi va a Roma sono io.
(4) Sono io che vado a Roma.
(5) (b) El que va a Roma soy yo.
    (b) Quien va a Roma soy yo.
(6) (a) Soy yo quien va a Roma.
    (b) Soy yo el que va a Roma.
(7) Celui qui va à Rome c’est moi.
(8) C’est moi qui vais à Rome.

The character of S shows a clear difference between WCS and ICS. In (3b), (5b) the configuration [wh-...] is a true free relative clause, in contrast with (1), (3a), (5a), (7), in which it appears with a pronoun antecedent (the one, colui, el, celui, respectively), that is, with a ‘head’. English generally has the type with a true free relative clause in sentences with what (What I saw was the landing of the plane), while with who the free relative clause now occurs only in proverbs or in the archaic and frozen syntax of liturgical and legal texts.

French, in contrast with Italian and Spanish, excludes completely the possibility of the true free relative clause:

(9) *qui va à Rome c’est moi

In any case, (1), (3a), (3b), (5a), (5b), (7) are correlative structures, which can be compared with a type of sentence which is very common in European languages, and which is a very old syntactic type in Indo-European languages (Sornicola 1988a).

(10) Who chooseth me must give and hazard all he hath (Shakespeare, Merch. ii. 7.16).
(11) Qui auroit botte d’hyver de tel cuir, hardiment pourquoi il pescher aux hytiers (Rabelais, Garg. ch. 40, p. 119 [Pleiadel])
(12) Quien busca el peligro perece en el (Don Quijote I, ch. 20).
(13) Chi ha detto questo sbaglia. ‘Who has said this errs.’

In all these cases wh- occurs in the first position in the first clause, establishing indefinite reference. (1), (3a), (3b), (5a), (5b), (7) are different from (10)–(13) only because they have an equative structure, whereas (10)–(13) have a predicative structure.

The situation of ICS is unlike that of WCS. There is in fact a controversy over whether true relative clauses appear in these sentences. In (2), (4), (6), (8) there appears to be no problem in recognizing the configuration [wh-...] as a relative clause. But let us consider the following English sentences (which

2. Syntax
2.1. Constructional type

This section will first deal with the syntactic properties of these two types of sentence, as they are found in English, French, Italian and Spanish. Let us consider the two types in English:

(1) The one who goes to Rome is me
(2) It is me who/that/O goes to Rome

[3] Among the Germanic languages, English and Swedish are the only ones to have both ICS and WCS. In the remaining languages, WCS is present, while ICS is not.

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can all be translated into French and Italian to produce sentences which present the same problem.\footnote{There are no corresponding Spanish translations. Adverbal phrases, prepositional phrases, temporal clauses, etc., cannot appear in Spanish in the focused position.}

(14) It is just when I’m going back home that she calls.
(15) It is only far from my country that I can live quietly.
(16) It is with great reluctance that I do that.

In these sentences, in which the focused element is a temporal clause, purpose clause (cf., It’s in order that you should repent that I say so) or a prepositional phrase or adverbial phrase, we find that as complementizer (Bresnan, 1977: 178). At this point we could conclude in favour of a heterogenous character of the clause adjacent\footnote{I will use for the moment this rather imprecise expression so as to avoid having to define the type of relationship that exists.} to the focused constituent X: in some cases it is a relative clause, in others it is a complement clause.\footnote{Chomsky (1977: 96) has also, in this connection, advocated a ‘double origin’ for ICS, following Pinkham & Hankamer 1975.}

However, if we look more closely at (2), (4), (6), (8), we see that this conclusion faces a number of difficulties. The supposed relative clauses do not correspond in an exact way to any known kind of relative clause. They cannot be considered appositive relative clauses because:

(a) they react negatively to the omission test (i.e. they cannot be omitted);
(b) the ‘intonational cues’ are different usually, in fact, they do not have a separate tonal group;
(c) for English, it should be pointed out that while that cannot be substituted for the wh-pronoun in the appositive clause, the clauses in question allow this substitution (cf. (2)). In addition, while in appositive clauses the wh-pronoun cannot be suppressed, in the clauses under consideration it can be (again, cf. (2)), especially in informal style.

On the other hand, these constructions are not typical restrictive relative clauses, either, for various reasons:

(a) they can be found adjacent to proper nouns and phrases which already have unique reference with respect to a given set of deictic coordinates:

(17) It’s John who/that/\(\Theta\) goes to Rome.
(18) It’s my brother who/that/\(\Theta\) goes to Rome.

This is not true of restrictive relative clauses:

(19) *John who goes to Rome is my brother.

On the other hand, a sentence like

(20) The brother of mine who goes to Rome is John.

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can have only one interpretation, namely: ‘I have more than one brother: the brother who goes to Rome is …’. This is not true of (18).

Actually, the extension of the focused referential element X cannot be reduced. The ‘adjacent’ clause is neither an ‘afterthought’ (as appositive clauses are), nor a constituent which is needed to identify X uniquely. Rather, it would seem to be an ‘addition’ of meaning, much like the comment in a topic-comment structure.

(b) There is some exclusively syntactic evidence which confirms this hypothesis. The ‘empty relatives’ are characterized by the deletion of wh- when the head in the relative clause has no subject relationship to the verb (is not the subject of the verb):

(21) The man I met.

but consider:

(22) The man who met you.
(23) It’s the man you

where (23) does not conform to this property.\footnote{Spanish, as we will also see in the treatment of the other properties, is completely different: \(\tilde{S}\) is in fact an indefinite relative clause.} Italian also presents evidence for the same conclusion:

(24) L’amico a cui ho consegnato il pacco è partito.
‘The friend to whom I gave the parcel has left.’
(25) È un’amico che ho consegnato il pacco.
‘It is that friend that I gave the parcel.’
(26) *È un’amico a cui/\(\tilde{\alpha}\) quale ho consegnato il pacco.
(27) È un’amico a cui/\(\tilde{\alpha}\) quale ho consegnato il pacco.
‘It is that friend to whom I gave the parcel.’

(24) has a restrictive relative clause, (25) has an ICS; if we try to substitute an explicit relative pronounal form for che in (25), we get in (26) an ill-formed sentence and in (27) an identifying structure with a restrictive relative clause. On the other hand, a sentence like (28), where the relative pronoun il quale occurs instead of the multi-function complementizer che, is also ill-formed:

(28) *È lui il quale non mi può vedere.

In conclusion, it seems more convincing to assume that \(\tilde{S}\) in ICS\footnote{ Cf. Jespersen, 1909 49 iii, §7.5; See also, Harris & Vincent (1980) on the omission of who and that in subject position of there-constructions.} has a completive nature, and is not a relative clause.
2.2. Agreement of the verb in the complement clause

A second facet of the ICS constructions which merits attention is agreement of the verb in the complement clause. In WCS, agreement is third person singular/third person plural for the verb in the *who* clause, and is obviously controlled by the head of the indefinite relative clause, or by the indefinite relative pronoun itself when the clause is a true free relative clause. The situation with regard to the verb in the complement clause is more complex. In one of the most widespread varieties of contemporary English (cf. Jespersen 1909: 49 III, 90), when the focused constituent X is a NP and an argument of the proposition expressed by the complement clause, the verb is always in the third person and agrees in number with the focused NP. (Contrast another variety of English which presents the type *It is I who am responsible*. See below, Section 2.5.)

(29) (a) It is me who/that is responsible.
(b) It is you who/that is responsible.
(c) It is him who/that is responsible.
(d) It is us who/that are responsible.
(e) It is you who/that are responsible.
(f) It is you who/that are responsible.

Apparently, what we find here is a sort of 'split agreement', with respect to number and person. Even if the controller of number can be easily recognized, it is not at all clear what will be the controller of person. The most obvious candidate is of course it, but this hypothesis is unsatisfactory because it forces us to see in sentences like (29a) (29f) an *ad hoc* summation of person and number features. In Section 2.5 a different hypothesis, intuitively more plausible, will be suggested.

The situation for Italian is completely different. In Italian agreement is controlled entirely (that is, with respect to both number and person) by the head of the focused NP:

(30) (a) Sono io che sono responsabile
    be-1SG 1 that be-1SG responsible
    'It's me who is responsible'
(b) Sei tu che sei responsabile.
    be-2SG you that be-2SG responsible
    'It's you who are responsible'

In Spanish, two options are possible:

(31) Soy yo quien va a Roma.
    be-1SG 1 who go-3SG to Rome

(32) "Soy yo la que voy a Roma.
    be-1SG 1 the-one that go-1SG to Rome

(33) Soy yo la que va a Roma.
    be-1SG 1 the-one that go-3SG to Rome

The indefinite relative pronoun *quien* has to select the third person singular of the verb, while the clause with *la que* seems to allow a greater liberty in verb agreement. (32), in fact, was considered an 'odd' sentence by some of the speakers interviewed. For these speakers, if the focused NP has the features of 1st, 2nd or 3rd person singular, the V in S must have 3rd person singular morphology:

(34) (a) Eres tu quien/la que va a Roma.
    be-2SG you who/the one that go-3SG to Rome
(b) Es el quien/el que va a Roma.
    be-3SG he who/the one that go-3SG to Rome

On the other hand, if the focused NP has the features of 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person plural, the V in S agrees with the NP:

(34) (c) Somos nosotros quienes/los que vamos a Roma.
    be-1PL we who/the ones that go-1PL to Rome
(d) Soys vosotros quienes/los que vais a Roma.
    be-2PL you who/the ones that go-2PL to Rome
(e) Son ellos quienes/los que van a Roma.
    be-3PL they who/the ones that go-3PL to Rome

The situation in French shows diachronic and socio-linguistic oscillations. In contemporary standard French the focused NP completely determines the form of V in S:

(35) (a) C'est moi qui vais à Rome.
(b) C'est toi qui vas à Rome.
(c) C'est lui qui va à Rome.
(d) C'est nous qui allons à Rome.
(e) C'est vous qui allez à Rome.
(f) C'est eux qui vont à Rome.

This does not hold in non-standard French and in some patois in rural areas (cf. Sornicola, in press b). In these varieties, we find a situation analogous to that in English; that is, if the focused NP is 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person singular, the verb in the complement clause will have 3rd person singular morphology,
but if the focused NP is 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person plural, the verb will have 3rd person plural morphology:

(36) (a) C'est moi qui va à Rome.
    It is me who go-3SG to Rome
(b) C'est toi qui va à Rome.
    It is you who go-2SG to Rome
(c) C'est lui qui va à Rome.
    It is him who go-3SG to Rome
(d) C'est nous qui vont à Rome.
    It is us who go-1PL to Rome
(e) C'est vous qui vont à Rome.
    It is you who go-2PL to Rome
(f) C'est eux qui vont à Rome.
    It is they who go-3PL to Rome

2.3. Control of reflexive in the complement clause

The determination of V in S, as one might expect, is related to the control of the reflexive anaphor in S. In one variety of English there is no person agreement between a personal pronoun in the focused NP and a reflexive pronoun that can occur in S (cf. Akmajian, 1970). There is, in any case, number agreement between the personal pronoun and focused NP, so that we have:

(37) (a) It is me who/that/O shaves himself.
    (b) It is us who/that/O shave themselves.

On the other hand, in the most widespread variety of English, the NP controls not only the reflexive but also the verb agreement:

(38) (a) It is me that cut myself.
    (b) It is you that cut yourself.

In standard French (39) and Italian (40), where the focused NP controls agreement of V in S, it also has complete control over the reflexive anaphor (in French: moi...me, toi...te; in Italian: io...mi, tu...ti):

(39) (a) C'est moi qui me lave.
    It is me who REFLECTIVE-3SG wash
(b) C'est moi qui se lave.
    It is me who REFLECTIVE-3SG wash
(c) C'est toi qui te laves.
    It is you who REFLECTIVE-2SG wash
(d) C'est nous qui nous lavons.
    It is us who REFLECTIVE-1PL wash
(e) C'est vous qui vous lavez.
    It is you who REFLECTIVE-2PL wash
(f) C'est eux qui se lavent.
    It is they who REFLECTIVE-3PL wash

The data for Spanish show a marginal codification. Both the sentences (41a, c) and the sentences (41b, d) have been judged grammatical by the speakers interviewed. A certain variation in the answers was shown for (41f, h) because not all the speakers agreed on their grammaticality:

(41) (a) Soy yo quien/el que me lavo.
    be-1SG I who/the-one that REFLECTIVE-1SG wash
(b) Soy yo quien/el que se lava.
    be-1SG I who/the-one that REFLECTIVE-1SG wash
(c) Eres tu quien/el que te lavas.
    be-2SG you who/the-one that REFLECTIVE-2SG wash
(d) Eres tu quien/el que se lava.
    be-2SG you who/the-one that REFLECTIVE-2SG wash
(e) Somos nosotros quienes/los que nos lavamos.
    be-1PL we who/the-ones that REFLECTIVE-1PL wash
(f) Somos nosotros quienes/los que se lavan.
    be-1PL we who/the-ones that REFLECTIVE-1PL wash
(g) Soyos vosotros quienes/los que os laváis.
    be-2PL you who/the-ones that REFLECTIVE-2PL wash
(h) Soyos vosotros quienes/los que se lavan.
    be-2PL you who/the-ones that REFLECTIVE-2PL wash

When the focused personal pronoun is 1st or 2nd person singular there can be agreement of the reflexive anaphor with the pronoun (and in this case there will be agreement between the pronoun and V in S), or there can be agreement with quien/el que. When the focused pronoun has the feature [+Plural], though, this would seem to bind the reflexive anaphor obligatorily. Thus, the type of sentence found in (41b, d) can be considered an equative-identifying structure with a basic configuration

(42) NP be S (X be Y)
Notice that we find this type in Italian also, but in Italian the independence of the free relative clause goes beyond this to create asymmetry of number between the term X and the term Y of the equative structure (cfr. (45), (46)):

(43) Sono io chi si lava.
be-1SG I who refl-3SG wash-3SG

(44) Chi si lava sono io.
who refl-3SG wash-3SG be-1SG I

(45) Siamo noi chi si lava.
be-1PL we who refl-3SG wash-3SG

(46) Chi si lava siamo noi.
who refl-3SG wash-3SG be-1PL we

The Spanish type of sentence (41b, d) and the Italian type (43) must be kept completely distinct from ICS. These sentences are related to WCS, and are different from WCS only with respect to the order of their constituents X and Y* (cf. also, the types lo sono un tipo che si offendono, ‘I am a person who takes offence (3SG)’, io sono un tipo che mi offendono ‘I am a person who takes offence (1SG)’ where both possibilities can be realized).

As far as Spanish is concerned, the oscillation found in (34a–c) and in (41a–h) proves, in any case, that in this language a process of grammaticalization of these structures is going on, influenced by various forces. The oscillation in verb agreement and in binding of the reflexive anaphor in S seems due to a conflict between the focused NP and the indefinite relative pronoun for the assumption of control over the syntactic processes in S when the head of NP is a personal pronoun with the feature [+ Singular] and with a high rank in the hierarchy of person (1st, 2nd), while the conflict is resolved in favour of NP when the 1st or 2nd person head of NP has the feature [+ Plural].

For the purposes of this paper the relevant point is that in all four languages examined the agreement of V and the agreement of the reflexive anaphor in S are closely related: if V and focused NP agree in both person and number, then there is also agreement between the reflexive anaphor and focused NP with respect to both person and number (cf. French, Italian and, in part, Spanish). If V has what we have called for the moment ‘split agreement’, in number with focused NP, and in person with the dummy subject it, the reflexive anaphor will also show such ‘split agreement’.10 (cf. the variety of English evidenced in examples (37a) and (37b)). This situation

is very different from the one in WCS, where in all four languages examined the reflexive anaphor in S is bound by the head of wh- (the one/the ones, etc.) or by wh- itself.

2.4 Agreement of the verb ‘be’

This is another important factor in the analysis of the structural and functional configurations of ICS and WCS. Although we can find some evidence in Middle English of agreement between be and focused NP (cfr., It am I that loveth so hoote Emelye the brighte: Chaucer A, 1736–37), it seems clear that the language has restructured the agreement pattern, giving control of be to it.11 Presumably, this has happened because of the influence of a general phenomenon in the language; that is, a phenomenon of drift towards an increasingly rigid thematicization in establishing the subject. It is also possible that a specific concomitant cause was the marking of the post-copular NP as accusative (see Section 2.5).

It is interesting to note that the same development has taken place in French, where we have evidence from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of agreement between focused NP and être instead of between ce and être. Thus, there must have been periods of oscillation in the norm, with the contemporaneous presence of both agreement patterns, before grammaticalization of this structure (a process strongly influenced by normative grammatical reflection) into a form with generalized agreement between ce and être was consolidated.

This result is thus in close relation to the similar drift undergone by English and French towards a kind of subjectivization with obligatory subject and rigid agreement between the verb and the element placed to its left, which is a well-known property of the Non-Pro-Drop languages. Italian and Spanish, on the other hand, show agreement to the right of ‘be’ with focused NP, a property we might expect to find in these two Pro-Drop languages. However, this explanation in exclusively syntactic terms is unable to take into account the agreement of ‘be’ which is produced in the WCS of these two languages. In contrast with English, in which agreement is with the head of the free relative clause (with respect to both person and number: the one [who/that....] is....X, the ones [who/that....] are....X) and with French, in which agreement is with ce (celui [qui....] c’est....X, ceux [qui....] c’est....X), once again in Italian and Spanish there is agreement between ‘be’ and focused NP (cfr. (3a–b), (5a–b)), even though a candidate for ‘subjecthood’, the indefinite relative pronoun, is available to the left of ‘be’. It is interesting to note, in fact, that this pronoun usually triggers agreement of the verb in the main clause in correlative predicative constructions (see (12) and (13)). Thus, what

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[9] The possibility of permuting of X and Y is a typical characteristic of the equative structures: see below, Section 3.

[10] For English, in fact, one should also consider a third factor in the agreement of the reflexive anaphor, and that is gender, which is controlled by the feature [Gender] of the head of the focused NP: It is her who/that/1/Ø washes herself/*himself.

we see in the WCS of Italian and Spanish is a kind of conflict between two candidates for subjecthood, resolved in favour of the candidate with the higher rank in the hierarchies of definiteness and focality. To put it in other terms, the semantic and pragmatic categories outrank the positional (syntactic) categories.

2.5. Case-marking of focused NP

There is yet another relevant problem with respect to the configurations assumed by ICS in the languages we are dealing with, and that is the case-marking of focused NP, or, to be more precise, of the personal pronouns which occupy this position. This is a crucial factor, because presumably it is precisely this factor which determines some of the syntactic properties of this kind of sentence.

English seems to have three different possibilities with respect to the functional structure of the complement clause:

(i) Choice between nominative/accusative according to whether the pronoun is or is not the subject of the clause:

(47) It is I who am sick.

(48) It is me who John is after.

This situation is the same as in Italian, where we have:

(49) Sono io che non lo posso vedere.
    be-1SG I that not him can-1SG see

(50) È me che non posso vedere.
    be-3SG me that not can-3SG see

(51) Sono io che non posso vedere.
    be-1SG I that not can-3SG see

(ii) Choice between nominative/accusative independently of the functional structure of the complement clause, but with repercussions for the agreement of the verb. For the speakers of English interviewed, the patterns in (52) and (53) are options in complementary distribution:

(52) It is I who am/*is responsible.

(53) It is me who *am/is responsible.

(iii) Generalization of the accusative with agreement of V in the complement clause to the third person.

In English there have been oscillations between case marking of nominative or accusative in preceding diachronic phases. The same has happened in French, although in contemporary standard French accusative case marking is generalized (cf. Sornicola, 1988b). In contrast with the nominative case marking (sentence types (47), (52)), which is a characteristic of literary and formal registers, possibility (iii) is becoming more and more widely used in contemporary English. This phenomenon has for some time affected other constructions, such as the locative-existential construction (There is me), the presentative construction (Here is me), the equative construction (That is me, a sentence type already evidenced in Shakespeare: That's me I warrant you [Twelfth Night 2.5.88]: If this should be thee Malvolio [ibid. 112]), of which WCS are only a sub-type (cf. (1)). In other words, this phenomenon has affected all the constructions in which the pronoun occurs in post-copular position. Thus, in all the examples mentioned, agreement of be is in the 3rd person, even in the locative-existential constructions and in the presentative constructions where there is no pronominal form in the third person which could trigger agreement. It is precisely this fact which leads to the conclusion that the underlying cause of the ‘abnormal syntax’ of ICS in English is the post-copular position of the pronoun and the drift towards marking this pronoun with the accusative case. These two factors must have caused a distortion of the syntactic process in the complement clause towards a syntax of the ‘non-person’, to use Benveniste’s (1956) term. What occurs in all the constructions we have examined is the use of the accusative as the unmarked case (cf. Jespersen, 1909-49: III, Sect. 18.9), which acts as a signal that the constituent in the post-copular position is the non-subject. In this position ‘subjecthood’ is neutralized in English, independently of whether or not there is another nominal preceding the copula, which is able to trigger the agreement of be. We can consider this to be an effect of the well-known preference in English for thematic subjects, even at the cost of their being “dummy” subjects. This characteristic can sometimes cause a sort of conflict between syntax and semantics: in ICS the conflict is with respect to the control of the syntactic processes in S.

Sentence type (52) follows a tendency opposite to the general trend of English, resolving the conflict between syntax and semantics in favour of the latter; thus, the focused nominal, even though it has none of the properties required for ‘subjecthood’ in English (thematic position, agreement with be) continues to control the syntactic processes in the complement clause because it has kept one important property of subjecthood, that is, nominative case-marking. Sentence type (53), on the other hand, exemplifies a tendency to resolve the conflict between syntax and semantics in favour of thematicization, neutralizing the focused element as a candidate for ‘subjecthood’.

We can at this point reformulate our hypothesis of ‘split control’ over the syntactic processes in S. Instead of thinking of it as controlling half of the processes and the focused NP controlling the other half, it seems more convincing to consider the feature [−Person] the controller. In fact, when the head of the focused NP is marked as non-subject, there is a sort of ‘demotion’ of the constituent with respect to the hierarchy of person, introducing a generalized non-person into the configuration of the structure.

[12] I am referring here to morphological 'case', and not to abstract 'Case'.
It is interesting that standard French has followed a path different from English in this respect. Marking the pronoun in focus with the accusative case does not correspond to a real neutralization of the hierarchy of person, because the focused element continues to control the processes in the complement clause. In considering the situation, in any case, one cannot avoid taking into account the great influence on this process of the centralized grammatical nativization of French. This nativization has blocked the tendency which would be analogous to the one in English, so that we find it only in non-standard French.

In keeping with their status as Pro-Drop languages, Italian and Spanish present no conflicts between syntax and semantics in ICS: the focused pronoun usually takes on itself all the properties of subjecthood; that is, it controls both agreement with ‘be’ and the syntactic processes in S.

3. Semantics

In this section a few semantic characteristics of ICS and WCS will be examined. A first point which deserves to be discussed is whether ICS and WCS are really synonymous and interchangeable as has sometimes been supposed (cf. Akmaian, 1970).

As is well known, synonymy is far from being a clearcut notion. A widely accepted possibility is that synonymy can be defined through logical equivalence. In this framework two sentences are said to be synonymous when they have the same logical form. In Russellian terms this is to be understood as a fully disambiguated reading of a sentence along with a truth condition for that reading such that all of the sentence entailment relations are captured. This view, however, has been recently questioned by supporters of so-called ‘Radical Pragmatics’, according to whom logical equivalence does not imply semantic identity. In Gazdar’s words (1979: 57): ‘Logically equivalent sentences are not required to have the same semantic representation, but only the same semantic interpretation [in the logical theory which is chosen, i.e. in the metalanguage used].’ In this alternative framework any ICS and its corresponding WCS, though logically equivalent in a given metalanguage, would not be synonymous, or to put it in a different way, would not have the same semantic representation. As a matter of fact they do not share values on the aboutness parameters. So for example, (1) is about ‘the one who goes to Rome’, whereas (2) is about ‘me’. A further difference concerns the definiteness parameter: in (1) the flow of information goes from the feature [+ Definite] in the phrase ‘the one who...’ to [+ Definite] in ‘me’, whereas in (2) it starts with the feature [− Definite] in the post-copular phrase and maintains this all through the sentence. Moreover, the predications in (1) and (2) are different: as we will see in a moment, (1) is a real equative sentence type, whereas (2) is not. What the predication in (1) expresses is that for any non-null possible world w, the extension of the definite description ‘the one who goes to Rome’ is the one-term set made up by ‘me’. The predication in (2) instead expresses a property ‘of mine’, that is, the property of going to Rome. Two interesting and difficult questions now arise: what the metalanguage should be in which to formulate the respective logical forms of (1) and (2) and to what extent these should reflect the considerations we have discussed so far. Atlas and Levinson (1981) have argued that the logical form of an ICS such as

(54) It was John that Mary kissed

would be, using the lambda-operator:

(55) ∃x(Kiss (Mary, x)) (John)

that is a formula with a complex one-place predicate symbol true of ‘John’. However, they do not commit themselves to saying whether the corresponding WCS would have the same logical form, though they observe that it would ‘highlight’ the properties of (54). The question concerning the respective logical forms of ICS and WCS, however, is not so crucial, once the Radical Pragmatics viewpoint has been accepted. For our purposes it suffices to say that ICS and the corresponding WCS do not have the same semantic representations.

A second controversial point is the equative status of the verb be in ICS. Halliday (1967, 1976) maintains that the WCS types

(56) What John broke was the window

(57) The one who broke the window was John

are ‘identifying clauses’. These should be considered as a subset of the set of ‘equivative clauses’ having the following characteristics: they are structured in two parts, one of which is nominalized; both parts are connected by the equative be (Halliday, 1976: 182). Halliday also defines two functions – the identifer and the identified – in terms of the identification relation ‘x is to be identified as y’; in other words, the identified is the thing to be identified, whereas the identifier is that with which it is to be identified. Thus, in identifying clauses the identifier is the element which corresponds to the wh-item in the wh-question presupposed by the subject clause (for example in (56) the presupposed wh-question is ‘what did John break?’ and so the element corresponding to wh- is ‘window’). The remaining part is defined as


[14] Cf. Halliday, 1967: 223–224: ‘An identifying clause has equative form, with class 2 be, but differs from a simple equative clause in that it represents a particular option in the theme system’. Furthermore, on p. 223 he states: ‘Since it is useful to be able to distinguish terminologically between a clause of this type [i.e. what John saw was the play], with nominalization, which contrasts systematically with a non-nominalized clause, and a simple equative clause without nominalization such as the leader is John, the former will be referred to here as “identifying” clause’.
the ‘identified’ (Halliday, 1967: 223–225). It is worth noting that in the WCS the identified part is always the *wh*-clause (or the *the one* *wh*-clause). Furthermore, in the unmarked case the identifier is the New and the identified is the Given (1967: 226–227).

But what about ICS? According to Halliday, these set up a further choice in the system, that is the predication of the theme. He would consider ICS of the type exemplified in (2) as equative structures, where *it*...*who/(that/O)* would be the identified, *me* the identifier, the relating being the equative be.15 Thus the meaning of a sentence like (2) would be very close to that of an identifying clause such as *I am the one who goes to Rome*, both being related to *I go to Rome* and differing from it in respect of only one feature (predicate vs non-predication of the theme). According to Halliday, however, ‘there is a difference between a clause with predicated theme and an identifying clause... In identification the prominence is cognitive i.e. with regard to our example “I and nobody else go to Rome”’, whereas in predication it is thematic i.e. “I and nobody else am the topic of the sentence”’ (Halliday 1967: 236). Notwithstanding these subtle observations, the basic assumption that the *it* *is* *X* who...type has an equative value is not convincing. There is evidence to support the claim that the relation ‘*X* equals *Y*’ is not involved here:

(a) *it* is a ‘dummy’ subject, having no referential status: it cannot be the *X* in the relation ‘*X* equals *Y*’. In other words, what is meant by the structure in question is not that a particular (though indefinite) individual of a possible world is to be identified with another particular, definite individual of the same (or another) possible world. That is so is further confirmed by the fact that the so called Pro-Drop languages, like Italian, in this kind of structure do not show any element that could be the *X* of the ‘*X* equals *Y*’ relation.

(b) One of the peculiar characteristics of equative sentences is that the constituents *X* and *Y* in the equative relations can be permuted – no matter what the effects of the permutation on the pragmatic level are.17 Thus we can have the one who goes to Rome is me and *I am the one who goes to Rome*, but it would be difficult to permute the structural constituents of ICS, and even the mapping of the identifying – identifier structure onto the structure

(58) *it – be – X – S*

is not easy to determine. Which constituents are to be permuted? A more general version of this problem would be: what is the configuration to which the permutation should be applied? A fundamental difficulty, among others, is faced in attempting to answer this. As has been pointed out in Section 2, the relationship between S on the one hand and X, *it* on the other hand, is complex. As a consequence we cannot be sure of the position to assign to S by permutation. Yet, whatever is assumed as the appropriate configuration, the outcome of permutation is always ill-formed:

(59) *John is it who/(that/O) goes to Rome*

(60) *It who/(that/O) goes to Rome is John*

(61) *John who/(that/O) goes to Rome is it*

Note that if *it* is considered a constituent that is not present in deeper configurations and is omitted in sentences (59), (60) a WCS structure will be obtained. This is no evidence, however, that ICS can be derived from WCS. Apart from considerations on the different nature of the *wh*-pronouns in ICS and WCS (see section 2), in order for this hypothesis to be seriously examined, one should explain why the verb *be* is not in its normal equative position. Actually, what the test shows is that the *it – be – X* subpart of the configuration can hardly be analysed into smaller constituents, i.e. that in this respect it behaves like a unit.

4. Textual properties

In this section some textual properties of ICS and WCS will be examined. When these structures are dealt with at the discourse level, one should attempt to ascertain: first, in which points of the textual network they occur and, secondly, to which parameters, if any, their distribution is related. These questions deserve to be further investigated, though recently some hypotheses about them have been advanced by Prince (1978) and Carlson (1983). On the assumption that ‘a WCS is nothing else than a question-answer

It’s assassino. Though both types can be represented as a sequence *NP – be – NP* at some level of categorial structure, they differ in a number of syntactic and semantic properties. Thus the term “identificational” is kept by Longobardi only for the first type, whereas the latter is termed “predicational”. Furthermore, according to Longobardi it is only the identificational structure that sets up the basic configuration for deriving ICS and WCS via *wh*-Movement.

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dialogue condensed into a sentence', Carlson (1983: 225) puts forward the following dialogue rule:

(62) A WCS of the form

\( \langle \text{wh-word} \quad X \quad \text{sentence} \quad Y \rangle \quad \text{be} \quad A \quad \text{answers the question} \quad i \quad \langle \text{wh-word} \quad X \quad \text{sentence} \quad Y \rangle \)

According to him these structures are 'peculiar grammatical constructions which serve the purpose of articulating a sentence as an answer to a particular question'. Hence for clefts to be appropriately used in a dialogue, an implied direct question, which is structurally identical to the free relative subject, should be interpolated in the semantic representation of the dialogue. As Carlson (1983: 225) puts it: 'In other words, to accept a WCS is to accept its subject as a topical question worthy of interest, or relevant to the dialogue'. Thus any WCS 'will be appropriate to a context only if its subject is a question that naturally arises in that context'. It is not clear, however, what 'naturally' means. Nor is Prince's discourse condition on clefts any clearer:

(63) A WCS will not occur coherently in a discourse if the material inside (the subject) wh-clause does not represent material which the cooperative speaker can assume to be appropriately in the hearer's consciousness at the time of hearing the utterance. (Prince 1978: 888)

Apparently a step forward in the puzzling problem of defining the WCS textual function is made by Carlson, who suggests the following rule (1983: 227):

(64) The subject question must occur among the premises of the cleft sentences in the dialogue game.

However, he does not seem to define more specifically how a 'premise' should be understood. If we have understood him correctly, what he means by this term is just 'antecedent', but the kind of logical link which relates it to the corresponding WCS is not clear, for nowhere in this discussion does he use such terms as 'entailment', 'implication', 'presupposition', or even 'implicature'. He just tries to skip over a ticklish question when he says: 'Two frequently encountered senses of 'presupposition' are approximated by the following characterizations: sentence S logically presupposes S' if the interrogative form of S entails S'; S pragmatically presupposes S' if S' is a necessary dialogue premise for S. These characterizations, if appropriate, suggest that the notion of presupposition is not needed as a primitive concept of our theory of discourse' (1983: 220). In one way or another, then, rule (64) is tantamount to affirming that the subject question is pragmatically presupposed by the whole WCS.

This conclusion does not lead us much further, given the rather controversial and vague status of the notion of 'pragmatic presupposition'.10 As a matter of fact, the alternative formulation in terms of pragmatic presupposition tells us nothing more than that the subject question must arise 'naturally' in the text. Now, it is well known that real texts in natural languages are highly complicated objects: such a question could be in the text in several different ways. The most obvious cases are those in which the questions actually occur in the text in the appropriate linear position, but they are not frequent. On the contrary, in the great majority of cases the question occurs as a paraphrastic variatio of the WCS wh-clause. Of course, it may not occur in the linear structure of the text and can only be inferred in the text's semantic representation -- often partially -- by some items in the surface of the text, or it may not be in the text's semantic representation at all.

As an example of paraphrastic variatio consider the following case, quoted by Prince: (1978: 887):

(65) There is no question what they are after. What the committee is after is somebody at the White House.

Here the embedded question what they are after is a close paraphrase of what the committee is after, showing the variation of one element.

This dialogue sequence, quoted by Carlson, is trickier:

(66) H: I'm really very sorry to disturb you. It's just that we're making a few inquiries about Margery Phipps.
K: What's this all about?
H: What I'd like to know is exactly what you did after shooting finished on the day that Margery Phipps died (Patricia Moyes, The Falling Star; cf. Carlson, 1983: 227).

We are not so sure as Carlson is that here the WCS wh-clause is but 'a polite paraphrase of the witness' abrupt inquiry'. As a matter of fact, the WCS seems to have multiple premises in the text, not just one. The utterance 'we're making a few inquiries' implicates 'we'd like to know something' and this, in turn, or better 'I'd like to know something', is presupposed by 'what would I like to know?'. That this is so is further confirmed by the fact that such a sequence as

(67) I'm really very sorry to disturb you. It's just that we're making a few inquiries about Margery Phipps. What I'd like to know is exactly what you did after shooting finished on the day Margery Phipps died.

[18] Carlson (1983: 226) in quoting this passage also observes: 'It remains obscure... what is meant by material inside sentences, and what is it for that material to be appropriately in anyone's consciousness.'

[19] On the whole question see Levinson, 1983, par. 5.2.
would be perfectly coherent. This evidence suggests that the occurrence in the text of a wh-question coinciding with the subject clause of a given WCS is not a necessary condition. This is not, however, the only evidence. In a great number of cases it is difficult to see how such a wh-clause can occur among the WCS ‘premises’. Let us consider a few passages from a cursory exploration in British newspapers and magazines:

(68) By comparison, the army’s share of defence spending has declined slightly, though it has more money in absolute terms than before 1981. With this, it has made some striking improvements… Where the army has done less well is in the programme to pre-position equipment in Europe, so that the fighting men can be flown over quickly in a crisis (The Economist, 13-19 April 1985, Rearming America, p. 44).

Here the utterance with this, it has made some improvement pragmatically presupposes ‘it has not made striking improvements with something’, because the focused phrase with this sets up an emphasis for contrast ‘and not with other things’. It is difficult to say exactly if the presupposed proposition is ‘it has not made striking improvements with something’ or ‘it has not made striking improvements with all the other things’ (i.e. if with this carries the unity implication or not). In my opinion this problem is not ‘decidable’ in the textual space where the utterance occurs. The utterances from real texts of natural languages often show various kinds of such undecidable problems which elsewhere have been termed ‘unsolvable syncretisms’ (Sornicol, 1981: 104-105). In the case under discussion we are dealing with a ‘presupposition syncretism’. It is only in the textual area where the WCS occurs that it can be solved, highlighting the content ‘with something’ (i.e. the non-unique interpretation of the preceding ‘with this’). The presupposed proposition ‘it has not made striking improvements with something’, however, is in a paraphrastic relation to the presupposed proposition of ‘where the army has done less well is…’, i.e. ‘the army has done less well in something’. We could intuitively say that the presupposition syncretism ‘it has not made striking improvements with something/all the other things’ raises the question of what this thing is/all the other things are. This could perhaps be an alternative formulation to Carlson’s ‘naturally arising question’. The point is however that such an expectation could hardly be a ‘premise’, whatever its meaning may be.

A more consistent condition would be the direct or indirect occurrence in the text of the wh-clause presupposition. Both (67) and (68) in one way or another satisfy this condition. Yet, is the occurrence in the text of such a presupposition really a general condition for WCS? I would say it is not. Let us consider the following sequence of textual examples:

(69) The scope of the change, revealed by Easter, came as a shock. For months officials at the Elysée had been talking about a ‘dose’ of PR to be injected in the present system, the objective being to forestall a conservative landslide next year and to help M. Mitterand carry on as overall head of government until his term expires in 1988. What he came up with was no dose, but a barrelful. France is to have full scale PR, which will mean expanding the national assembly from 491 to 577 seats (The Economist, 13-19 April 1985, France. Battle for the centre, p. 59).

(70) …miners are making it clear that they have not the heart for much more fighting…what miners want now is cash in hand and a secure future (The Economist, 30 March to 5 April 1985, Miners. Back to normal, pp. 40-42 passim).

(71) What excited Washington was whether the UN’s failure in Geneva could be converted into an early foreign policy coup for President Reagan: the liberation of Africa’s last real colony (The Economist, 30 March to 5 April 1985, America and South Africa, p. 19).

(72) At this point, western liberals can begin talking with large numbers of White South Africans. What frustrates them is their impotence to carry talk into action (ibid. p. 34).

In (69) the wh-clause pinpoints the boundary of a textual area which is discontinuous as regards the immediately preceding sentence; its semantic content, in fact, is first related to the non-contiguous textual area ending with The scope of the change… came as a shock. We can see that, compared with the preceding sentence, the wh-clause has a contrastive value, bringing into focus the item barrelful: it develops further and explains the sequence The scope... as a shock and in so doing establishes a turning-point in the text towards the climax of a wide textual area whose semantic information network could be represented informally by the proposition set:

(73) (a) A change has occurred in the French government
(b) Its scope is very wide
(c) It was sudden and shocking

Now, can we say that such a statement as ‘he came up with something’ is among the premises of the WCS? Such a question does not seem to require a yes–no answer. Once again the problem is what we mean by ‘premise’. We have already observed that real texts can have a very complicated semantic network and that to reconstruct this often requires many interpolations of missing links. This is a very subtle procedure, one difficult to formalize, for not only has it to do with the internal semantic properties and relations of the lexical items involved (that is, with analytic knowledge), but also with the speaker’s knowledge of the world (that is, with synthetic knowledge). For example, in For months... in 1988, which gives an account of how the change had been prepared, we could condense a semantic content ‘plan (by the officials at the Elysée)’. Now, an item actually occurring in the text such
as ‘objective’ is perfectly consistent with this condensed meaning: we can consider it as one of the clues which could lead to the presence of the WCS wh-clause. Yet the link is not in terms of a ‘necessary and sufficient’ condition. The coherence of real texts has an internal degree of indeterminacy and vagueness which cannot be eliminated.

The situation is, in a sense, similar in (70), where the presupposition that ‘there is something that miners want now [i.e. at the time the article was written]’ can be inferred from the whole text, which is a report on the progress of the English miners’ long strike. In this case, this is a premise to the wh-clause. Here again, however, it is a complete subsystem of knowledge of the world that allows for the appropriate occurrence of the wh-clause: the actual clues in the text are even more difficult to find than in the previous case.

As to both (71) and (72), it seems that the presuppositions of the respective WCS wh-clause in no way occur in the preceding co-text. In Prince’s terms, the cooperative speaker could not have assumed the propositional contents of the relevant wh-clauses as material appropriately in the reader’s consciousness at the time of reading.

Thus it looks as if neither the occurrence of a question coinciding with the wh-clause of a WCS nor the occurrence of the typical presupposition associated with the WCS wh-clause can be generalized as a necessary condition for WCS. This in turn would suggest that WCS have much to do with the problem of discontinuous information in the text.

Another point, however, needs to be justified. We observed earlier that in (69) the WCS is used as a contrasting device. This contrasting value often occurs and is all the more clear in the kind of textual function which WCS often have:

(74) Although the White House has altered the treasury’s original plan of tax reform in some ways that are economically regrettable and politically dangerous, what remains is much more than mere thinking...It hardly matters that Mr. Reagan wants the plan, as critics say, for the wrong reason... What does matter is that the plan will get the presidential push it needs to have any chance of survival (The Economist, 30 March to 5 April 1985. ‘Now leave it alone’, p. 14).

(75) In his now-famous ‘star wars’ speech in March, 1983, Mr. Reagan reminded scientists that they had invented the bomb and challenged them, in effect, to disintegrate it. He asked them to use all their ingenuity to make nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete’. That is not a literal possibility... What might be possible is to blunt the specific threat posed by intercontinental ballistic missiles (The Economist 13 19 April 1985, ‘Science and Technology: Bottling the Nuclear Game’, p. 89).

The same phenomenon can be seen in narrative texts:

(76) A girl stood on the shingle that fringes Millbourne Bay, gazing at the red roofs of the little village across the water. She was a pretty girl, small and trim. Just now some secret sorrow seemed to be troubling her, for on her forehead were wrinkles and in her eyes a look of wistfulness. She had, in fact, all the distinguishing marks of one who is thinking of her sailor lover.

But she was not. She had no sailor lover. What she was thinking of was that at about this time they would be lighting up the shop windows in London, and that of all the deadly, depressing spots she had ever visited this village of Millbourne was the deadlest (Wodehouse, Something to worry about).

Carlson quotes examples of this kind, observing (1983: 227) that ‘often the informational interest which motivates the cleft can be inferred from the presence of alternative answers to the same question’. This could induce us to reconsider the problem of the WCS textual premise: if the hypothesis that the wh-question is a necessary premise to WCS is to be ruled out, how should this phenomenon be explained? Once again a solution can be offered by analyzing the network of logical relations underlying the text. Consider in (74) the italicized utterances where the negation operator occurs. If out of context they would be ambiguous, each admitting the following respective interpretations:29

(77) It does not matter that Mr. Reagan wants the plan for the wrong reason.
(a) ‘It is not the fact that Mr. Reagan wants the plan for the wrong reason that does matter’
(b) ‘It is not the case that it does matter that Mr. Reagan wants the plan for the wrong reason’

(78) That is not a literal possibility.
(a) ‘It is not that that is a literal possibility’
(b) ‘It is not the case that that is a literal possibility’

(79) She was not thinking of her sailor lover.
(a) ‘It was not her sailor lover that she was thinking of’
(b) ‘It is not the case that she was thinking of her sailor lover’
(c) ‘Thinking of her sailor lover was not what she was doing’

The (a) paraphrases show an association of negation and Focus, whereas the (b) paraphrases do not, i.e. negation is out of the scope of Focus; this is the case in (79c) too. It is the (a) interpretation, however, that must be picked out in the contexts (77)–(79). The contrasting value of WCS then seems to consist

[29] As to the connection between focus and negation see Jackendoff, 1974: 254ff.
in bringing into focus a new information unit and in contrasting it with a previously focused information unit for which a certain predication does not hold true; on the contrary, this is stated to hold true for the newly focused information unit. We could represent this situation in the following way:

(80) (a) It is not the fact that Mr. Reagan... that does matter neg FOCUS PERSUISION
(b) What does matter is that the plan will get...

PERSUISION FOCUS

Intuitively, the fact that the first information unit is negated as a domain of the predication raises the expectation of a substitute. This intuitive way of justifying the phenomenon can be shown to have an alternative formulation. Note that (77a) presupposes:

(81) ‘Something does matter’

(78a) presupposes:

(82) (a) ‘something is a literal possibility’
(b) ‘something is really possible’

whereas (79a) presupposes:

(83) ‘she was thinking of something’

It is the occurrence of these presuppositions in the text’s logical network that makes the WCS in (74)–(76) appropriate in their textual environment. (81)–(83) in fact are also each presupposed by the wh-clause of the respective WCS. Thus, once again, it seems that an actual, though not general, textual condition on WCS would be the occurrence, either in the text’s linear manifestation or in its underlying logical network, of the wh-clause presupposition. It might be that the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of this condition defines two textual functions of WCS: to carry on a continuous flow of information or, on the contrary, to establish a break, a turning point in the flow of information.

From a pragmatic point of view, however, WCS seem to have some general characteristics. It seems as if in the whole textual area where the phenomenon occurs the progression carries on more slowly, causing an otherwise thematic (or less thematic) element to become a maximum theme (as regards that textual area). Thus we could consider this phenomenon as a strategy which enlarges the textual space, making the ‘communicative dynamism’\(^1\) increase either by determining two themes and contrasting them or by changing into rhematic what would have been a thematic

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{We are referring here to the notion which has been defined by Firbas as ‘the extent to which the sentence elements contribute to the development of the communication, to which it pushes the communication forward’ (Firbas, }1964:\textsuperscript{270).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{In the light of what happened, I could wish that it were possible to portray him as a hulking brute of evil appearance and worse moral, the sort of person concerning whom one could reflect comfortably that he deserved all he got. I should like to make him an unsympathetic character, over whose downfall the reader would gloat. But honesty compels me to own that Ted was a thoroughly decent young man in every way. He was a good citizen, a dutiful son, and would certainly have made an excellent husband. Furthermore, in the dispute on hand he had right on his side fully as much as Tom. The whole affair was one of those elemental clashings of man and man where the}\]
historian cannot sympathize with either side at the expense of the other, but must confine himself to a mere statement of what occurred. And briefly, what occurred was that Tom... bringing to the fray a pent-up fury which his adversary had had no time to generate, fought Ted to a complete standstill in the space of two minutes and a half (ibid.).

To sum up, then, WCS seem to have the textual function of actualizing the final part of a climax, the one where the main theme of a whole coherent semantic progression occurs.

Let us examine the textual function of ICS. It is well known that this kind of sentence conveys emphasis for contrast. We could describe this fact informally by saying that inside a domain of items of which a certain predication can be true for any specified possible world w, one is picked out; this is the item which fills the Focus position of the structure.

We have already criticized on syntactic grounds the idea that it is a pronoun referring to something of which the predication in the complement clause is true, and which the remaining part of the main clause would identify. Another unconvincing point is the justification of the ‘topic-neutrality’ of the initial pronoun it (that is, its non-sensitiveness to person, gender and number) by the fact that it would identify an answer and thus an abstract object. The argument in favour of this hypothesis is that we can find an it-cleft in sentences that identify reasons or explanations. Thus in the following passage:

(87) I am afraid that we have to let you go. It is not that we do not like you. It is just that we can no more use you. (Carlson, 1983: 232).

Carlson argues that the it-cleft is an answer to ‘what is the reason (explanation) for this?”. Once again, however, it seems that even in this case the occurrence of it has little to do with the semantics of the sentence and much more to do with the syntactic properties of English.

Nor do we agree with the assumption that the inherent semantic properties of it would account for the ‘unicity entailment’ supposedly related to ICS. It is doubtful whether the reply in (88)

(88) A: Who came?
B: It was John.

really means that ‘It was John and only John’/ ‘It was John and nobody else who came’. Consider for example the following quotations:

(89) To Mr. Crocker, exploring the marginally more glamorous terrain of Angola, South Africa’s destabilization of Mozambique was a regrettable sideshow. Yet as with its economic assault on Zimbabwe in 1982, it was adventurism which Mr. Crocker had to confront if his diplomacy was to carry credibility with the black states of Africa (The Economist, 30 March–5 April 1985, America and South Africa, p. 22).

(90) By the start of this year, it was Mr. Crocker rather than Afrikanerdom who appeared trapped in a laager (ibid. p. 26).

(91) The talk by 1960s and 1970s was of a postwar “consensus”, a political “centre” variously called mixed-economy. Butskellite, social market, etcetera... It was this consensus which the past six years of Ronald Thatcher are rightly said to have ‘broken’. In its place a new middle ground of politics emerged (The Economist, 1–7 June 1985, What they leave behind, p. 11).

It does not seem to be the case that in any of the passages quoted the ICS allows for an interpretation ‘It is X and only X who...’, though in other instances this interpretation would be likely. Such instances, however, suffice to demonstrate that the unicity entailment cannot be considered as a general property of ICS as such. This assumption appears to be but another case when semantic speculation on it has been wrongly applied to the whole construction, leading to erroneous conclusions. The point is that the peculiar contrasting function of an element in a domain does not exclude, in principle, the existence outside the domain of one or more elements to which the same predication can be applied. In (90) for example the domain within which a contrast is to be set up is given by Mr. Crocker and the Afrikanerdom, yet there could be other individuals, outside this domain, ‘trapped in a laager’. Of course the notion of domain is closely related to the speaker’s beliefs, expectations and memories, that is to the ‘possible world’ he has in mind in uttering the cleft. In other words, if we must admit the unicity property, this concerns the post-copular NP as a discourse topic and not its referential and semantic role in the propositional scheme. Thus in It is Mary who ate the apple we will have the implicature ‘Mary and only Mary is the topic of the sentence’, not ‘Mary and only Mary ate the apple’ (cf. Halliday, 1967: 236).

Consider now the textual properties of ICS. According to Carlson the dialogue rule for ICS is the following:

(92) An it-cleft sentence of the form
it be A (Comp X – t – Y)
answers a question of the form
i (wh-phrase – X – t – Y)

[22] For this idea, see Carlson (1983: 230), who agrees with Bolinger (1977: 66) in claiming that ‘Sentences with it differs in meaning from sentences without it’ and that ‘the difference can be assigned to it as a member of the set that includes he, she, and they’.

[23] This thesis has been defended by Bolinger (1977: 54 & 79), Carlson (1983: 231–235). Atlas and Levinson (1981) criticizing the ‘exhaustiveness’ implicature (i.e., the uniqueness implicature) of Halvorsen, reach the conclusion that ‘there is no uniqueness presupposition for clefts. Instead, the affirmative sentence It was John that Mary kissed, but not the preferred (choice negation) understanding of the negative sentence It wasn’t John that Mary kissed, entails Mary kissed (exactly) one person’ (20–70).
The thematic value of the X element is by no means unproblematic. As I have argued elsewhere (Sornicola, 1986), the notions of theme and rhyme do not always coincide with Given – New, Topic – Comment, or with Focal – Non-Focal. The X is often a given element, that is, an element which has already occurred in the co-text and is picked up again later (by different devices such as repetition, sloppy identity, paraphrase, synonymy, hyperonymy, hyponymy, etc.) to constitute the starting point of a new predication. It is thus often the case that the X is merely an "intensification" phenomenon, which lends emphasis and which could be paraphrased as "just X":

(93) My friends and co-workers there were people such as Eberhard Bethge, Helmut Gollwitzer, members of the Bonhoeffer family, and others who resisted the Nazis. It is these Christian friends of mine who insist on teaching their fellow Germans that atonement, remorse, and the rebuilding of moral values must precede the reconciliation and forgiveness. God’s grants (The Times, June 22, 1985, p. 9, letter by Albert H. Friedlaender, Dean of the Bucer College).

(94) Long ago, in the 60s and 70s, the undisputed keeper of the keys to the kingdom of data processing was the Management Information Services Manager, or MIS manager for short. It was he who developed the monolithic computer systems of that departed era... (The Guardian, June 24 1985, Is in the know out of favour?, p. 10).

(95) Mr. Gorbachev has probably spotted two better opportunities, which involve less risk than either of those. His very first diplomatic move after getting Russia’s top job was to send a friendly signal to China. His second could come at the Russian-American arms talks in Geneva... It is at the Geneva talks with the Americans that Mr. Gorbachev has most to play for right now... (The Economist, March 30 April 1985, The Gorbachev options, p. 10).

In (93) and (94) the X element seems to be nothing more than an emotionally colored theme. Many factors seem to "conspire" towards that: X has a Given value, it has an Agent role and a Subject function in the S. (95) is rather different, for the semantic role of "at the Geneva talks with the Americans" would normally be codified on the rightmost slot in the linear arrangement, that is, according to the ordo naturalis principle. In the normal case it would convey the maximum communicative dynamism (cf. Mr. Gorbachev has most to play for right now at the Geneva talks with the Americans). I have argued elsewhere that the shifting to the left of any item in the unmarked case lowers the degree of "communicative dynamism" (Sornicola, 1985, 1986). Now the problem is: does the above mentioned phrase observe the ordo naturalis or the ordo artificialis? In other words, is it thematic or rhematic? This is difficult to answer, because the interplay of the Given – New effect on the one hand, and of the semantic and syntactic effects on the other does not give converging results. Furthermore, it is not clear whether in this case the shifting to the left is due to the given property of the X item or to a focus displacement onto it.

The following are cases where the X element is a New one:

(96) I saw a notice up, ‘Studio to let’. I reflected that, having done a little painting in an amateur way, I could pose as an artist all right; so I took the studio. Also the name of Alan Beverley. My own name is Bill Bates. I had often wondered what it would feel like to be called by some name like Alan Beverley or Cyril Trevelyan. It was simply the spin of the coin which decided me in favour of the former (Wodehouse, The man upstairs).

(97) Her vanity received no pleasant stimulation from the fact that it was for her sake that this storm had been let loose (Wodehouse, Something to worry about).

(98) Jealousy, according to an eminent authority, is the "hydra of calamities, the seven fold death". Arthur Welsh’s was all that and a bit over. It was a constant shadow on Maud’s happiness. No fair-minded girl objects to a certain tinge of jealousy. Kept within proper bounds, it is a compliment; it makes for piquancy; it is the gin in the ginger-beer of devotion. But it should be a condiment, not a fluid.

It was the unfairness of the thing which hurt Maud. Her conscience was clear... (Wodehouse, When doctors disagree).

These seem to be real instances of ordo artificialis, that is the X element is the sentence rhyme. Another interesting case suggests that when both the X element and the complement clause are partially Given, X can be the rhyme:

(99) The poor MIS manager, who had inveighed against the wicked waste of indiscriminate buying of incompatible Apples and Pets and Tandys, now found himself lumbered with loads of bulk bought, almost new 8-bit machines, discontinued software and discontented users. It was the MIS manager and his mania for standards and compatibility who had got himself and his company into this mess (The Guardian, June 24, 1985. Is in the know out of favour?, p. 10).
To sum up, then, the ICS type appears to be a syntactic strategy bringing into focus non-verbal constituents such as NP, AdvP, but this does not mean that they should necessarily be thematic.

Finally, let us add a few remarks on the pragmatic non-equivalence of ICS and WCS and on their non-interchangeability. Let us replace the WCS by its corresponding ICS in the text (72):

(100) At this point, Western liberals can begin talking with large numbers of White South Africans. It is then impotence to carry talk into action that frustrates them.

The communicative progression here seems to be even less continuous than the one in (72) (recall that the presupposition ‘something frustrates them’ does not occur in the preceding co-text). In a sense, it is as if too much information were condensed in the sentence. Note, however, that (100) would be improved by inserting but immediately before the ICS.

We could tentatively put forward the hypothesis that in the cases where the subject who-clause of the WCS is New (i.e., where it does not occur as a ‘presupposition’ in the preceding co-text) the WCS cannot be substituted by the corresponding ICS. This rightly predicts that such a substitution is possible in the environments (68), (70), where the subject who-clause of the WCS is Given:

(101) By comparison, the army’s share of defence spending has declined slightly, though it has more money in absolute terms than before 1981. With this, it has made some striking improvements... It is in the programme to preposition equipment in Europe that the army has done less well...

(102) ...miners are making it clear that they have not the heart for much more fighting... It is cash in hand and a secure future that miners want now.

Moreover, note that if we substitute the WCS with the corresponding ICS in (94) the suspense-creating effect would be lost. On the other hand, the substitution of a ICS by a WCS (as in the environment (90)) does not always give as a result an acceptable text:

(103) The talk by 1960s and 1970s was of a postwar ‘consensus’, a political ‘centre’ variously called mixed-economy, Butskellite, social market, etcetera... What the past six years of Ronald Thatcher are rightly said to have broken is this consensus.

The occurrence of the WCS in the alternative text is rather clumsy, because of the fact that the subject who-clause carries too ‘heavy’ a load. Generally speaking, one of the characteristics of ICS seems to be that ‘heavy’ constituents are avoided. There is, however, another reason for the lower acceptability of the alternative text. The point is that consensus is Given, and so its occurrence in the final part of the WCS seems to be ‘abnormal’. It would be better perhaps if consensus were preceded by such a lexical item as just, for in this case just would realize a mise en relief. As a matter of fact, it seems that in the thematic position of WCS only new or emphatically contrasted elements can occur.

Thus the difference in the order of the given–new, i.e. a linear property of the structures under discussion, would seem to differentiate their textual distribution.

5. Synthesis

So far we have discussed some syntactic, semantic and pragmatic characteristics of ICS and WCS. Many differences have emerged, which we will now try to organize into a more comprehensive account. In so doing we will use a multi-factorial frame of analysis that can help to contrast the various idiosyncratic properties of the two types in question in a more clearcut fashion. From our discussion, the following parameters emerge as crucially involved in the discrimination of ICS and WCS. It is not claimed here that they are all and only the parameters involved, but rather they are some of the relevant ones: the list, in fact, is tentative and empirical.

(104) Verbal agreement
Leftmost position
Control of reflexive pronouns
Control of co-referential pronominalization
Absolute reference
Aboutness
Definiteness
Focus/non-focus
Given/new
Theme/rheme

Before going on, however, a few details on some of these parameters may be appropriate. The parameters Verbal agreement, Leftmost position, Control of reflexive pronouns, Control of co-referential pronominalization, Absolute reference and Aboutness are a subset of the list of subject properties which was proposed by Keenan (1976). The list seems to succeed in capturing some of the relevant peculiarities of ICS and WCS. The choice of some of them

[25] Thus some properties which are peculiar at least of ‘prototypical’ English subjects have been ruled out, for they do not define any cleft candidate for subjecthood. This is the case for the Agency property. As has already been observed, Agent is not the only semantic role that can fill the X position in ICS when X = NP, nor is agency concerned with equitativity. Other properties (e.g. immediate dominance, selectional restrictions), because of the debates over the way the cleft D-structure representation is generated, are difficult to tackle.
(i.e. leftmost position) is of special interest for the nature of the subject in English. In applying Keenan's subject properties, however, a possible objection, among others, must be considered and discussed. As is well-known, Keenan's properties concern what he termed "basic sentences." Now, ICS seem to be non-basic, whereas WCS show a more doubtful status. Whatever their characterization may be as regards the basic/non basic dichotomy, the adoption of Keenan's properties here is guaranteed by the fact that they are used as a heuristic method of structural contrast.

Focus is understood as the peak in prominence, that is the centre of attention. Note that it does not necessarily coincide with the theme, taking the latter as the element carrying the highest degree of Communicative Dynamism (CD). Interrogative sentences can be a good example of this: when who goes to Rome? the Focus is who, whereas the theme is to Rome. Incidentally, 'theme', taking this as the element which carries the lowest degree of CD, does not necessarily overlap with the Aboutness parameter, for the element carrying the lowest degree of CD in a sentence may be different from the one which the sentence is 'about'. So, for example, a dummy element like it in the ICS type can be the theme, whereas the post-copular phrase is the element which the sentence is 'about'. I should also add that the textual property expressed by the pair Given/New is better understood as a 'cline', not as a dichotomy, that is a notion of 'relative givenness', as well as a notion of 'relative newness' seems to be more useful.

We observed earlier that ICS and WCS differ in the Aboutness as well as in the Definiteness parameter. We can say now that they differ also in subjecthood, if we test the candidates for subjecthood in both structures under discussion against Keenan's properties. We will consider as candidates both it, X = NP in ICS and the one + [wh- clause...], X = NP in WCS. The admission of the Xs among the candidates for subjecthood could seem counter-intuitive, but we will see that this choice has some foundation.

Obviously, it and the one + [wh-clause...] share the parameter [+ Leftmost position], whereas X = NP in ICS, X = NP in WCS will be [+ Leftmost position]. On the contrary, the one + [wh-clause...], X = NP in ICS, X = NP in WCS share the parameter [+ Absolute reference].

The parameters involving co-reference control and verbal agreement are more troublesome, as will already be clear from the discussion in section 2. Let us consider co-reference control first. In the case of WCS, the one + [wh-clause...] has the obvious assignment of the feature [+ control of Reflexive Pronoun]. In ICS, on the other hand, according to the final hypothesis in section 2.5., the controllers of the reflexive pronouns in S are neither it nor X = NP in the variety of English using It is me who/that/Ø shaves himself, and only X = NP in the variety using It is we/us who/that/Ø shave ourselves.

The test for controlling the co-referential pronounization shows that X = NP in ICS, X = NP in WCS are controllers, whereas it and the one + [wh-clause...] are non-controllers:

(104) It is John who talked to Bill. He then left

(105) The one who talked to Bill was John. He then left

As far as verbal agreement is concerned, a distinction between the agreement of be and the agreement of V in S is in order. We have already noticed (see Section 2) that in WCS the one triggers both the agreement of be and the agreement of V in the wh-clause, whereas ICS show a more complex situation: it controls the inflection of be, while the inflection of V in S is controlled neither by it nor by X = NP in the variety of English using It is me who/that/Ø is sick, by X = NP in the variety using It is I who/that/Ø am sick.

As to the Focus parameter, WCS seem to have the following distribution of prominence:

(106) the one +[wh-clause...] be X

FOCUS NON-FOCUS

whereas ICS show the following one:

(107) It be X

FOCUS NON-FOCUS

Let us consider now the Given/New distribution in the two structures. We have already seen that there are some fixed properties of ICS and WCS as regards this parameter. We can sum up what we noted earlier by the following diagram:

(108) the one [wh-clause...]

(a) GIVEN

NEWER than the one + [wh-clause]

(or partially GIVEN)

(b) NEW

NEWER than the one + [wh-clause]

As can be seen, the wh-clause can be either Given or New, but the value of X must always be Newer than that of the one + [wh-clause...]. (108a) is the case exemplified in texts (65)-(70) and concerns what we could term the 'continuous informational function' of WCS. (108b) is instantiated by texts
(71) (72) and concerns what we have termed the 'discontinuous informational function' of WCS. I suspect though this should be further investigated - that within the four possible linear combinations of Given and New, two are ruled out, namely:

(109) the one [wh-clause... be X 
(a) GIVEN GIVEN 
(b) NEW GIVEN 
(or NEWER than X)

It can be observed, however, that (109a) is perhaps more an ideal that an actual possibility, for even the slightest difference in giverness between the two sections makes the situation fall into either the new-given case (i.e. (109b)) or into the Given-New one (i.e. (108a)).

ICS seem to have a wider range of options:

(110) it be X [s...]
(a) NEW GIVEN 
(or NEWER than the 
wh-clause) 
(b) NEW NEW 
(c) GIVEN NEW (or NEWER than X)

that is, the only combination that seems to be ruled out is Given-Given, which, as we said, is rather an ideal case and thus not significant.

In short, the interesting point seems to be that the X in the WCS cannot be Given (or more Given than the wh-clause), whereas the X in the ICS can be either New or Given, though - as we will see in a moment - this has an important effect on the theme-rheme structure of ICS. The discussion of the Theme/Rheme parameter, in fact, brings to light a peculiar correlation between Given/New and Theme/Rheme in the sentence types in question. No matter what the distribution of Given/New is in WCS, their theme-rheme structure will be:

(111) the one [wh-clause... be X 
T    Tr R
As for the ICS, in the cases of Given/New distribution (110a), (110b) the theme-rheme structures will be, respectively:

(112) (a) It be X [s...]
T    Tr R 
R    T 
(b) It be X [s...]
R    R 

Consider now the case (110c), that is the case in which X is only an 'emotionally coloured' item. Here the theme-rheme distribution will be:

(113) It be NP S
[+ Leftmost position] [- Leftmost position] 
[+ Be agreement] [- Be agreement] 
[- Agreement of V in S] [+ Agreement of V in S]  
[- Control of reflexive pronoun] [+ Control of reflexive pronoun] 
[- Control of coreferential pronoun] [+ Control of coreferential pronoun] 
[- Absolute reference] [+ Absolute reference] 
[- Aboutness] [+ Aboutness] 
[- Rheme] [+ Rheme] 

(114) the one + [wh-clause... be NP
[+ Leftmost position] [- Leftmost position] 
[+ Be agreement] [- Be agreement] 
[+ Agreement of V in S] [+ Agreement of V in S]  
[+ Control of reflexive pronoun] [+ Control of reflexive pronoun] 
[- Control of coreferential pronoun] [+ Control of coreferential pronoun] 
[- Absolute reference] [+ Absolute reference] 
[- Aboutness] [+ Aboutness] 
[- Definiteness] [+ Definiteness] 
[- Focus] [+ Focus] 
[+ New] [+ New] 
[- Rheme] [+ Rheme]

While (112a), (112b) are instances of ordo artificialis, (112c) is not; in other words, it is quite similar to the corresponding non-cleft structure in its CD distribution, the difference being presumably in the speaker's attitude involved.

We will now consider each parameter as a feature to be specified with a ' + ' or ' - ' value in it. X and the complement clause (S) of ICS on the one hand, and in both X and the one + [wh-clause...] of WCS on the other hand. The following matrices can be set up for the two structures:

[29] The NP in the X position can be [- Definite] (i.e. non-identifiable) in both ICS and WCS: cf. it was a dustman John saw yesterday, the one who John saw yesterday was a dustman.

[30] The features [Agreement of V in S] [Control of reflexive pronoun] are obviously interrelated: if [+ Agreement of V in S] then [+Control of reflexive pronoun], if [- Agreement of V in S] then [-Control of reflexive pronoun].
New and Rheine have been assumed by convention as the labels of the respective parameters. This choice is by no means unproblematic as we assumed earlier that Given/New and Theme/Rheme should be considered as a ‘cline’, not a dichotomous variable. This difficulty could be approached by the use of coefficients rather than plusses and minuses. A further problem would be the introduction of a formalism making the values of the features [New] and [Rheme] interdependent in the X and in the S of ICS. The same formalism would link the features [Agreement of V in S] and [Control of reflexive pronoun].

This representation makes it evident that the two structures differ not only in the order of the constituents, but in the bundles of features associated with them. It underlines that in ICS the syntactic and semantic properties of ‘subjecthood’ are split between the NP in X; the former unites the syntactic properties, the latter the semantic ones (apart from the control of reflexive pronouns, the lack of which can be justified with specific reasons). Furthermore, it is scarcely relevant from the pragmatic point of view — as obvious — the NP in X shows a wide range of pragmatic properties. Interestingly, some of these are typical of predicative, of not of subjects. The above scheme also makes clear that in WCS the one [wh-clause ...] absorbs most of both the syntactic and semantic properties of subjecthood. Here a kind of split occurs between syntactic and semantic properties of subjecthood, on the one hand, and such informational properties as definiteness, focality, newness, thematicity, on the other. The one [wh-clause ...] is almost subject-like, whereas the NP has the pragmatic properties of predicative, while retaining a semantic property which is typical of subjects, i.e., the control of co-referential pronounization. However, the major interest of the picture we have drawn lies perhaps in the complicated intertwining of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics that is thereby revealed. It suggests that this interplay of these levels of analysis still remains one of the most puzzling questions in linguistic research.

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